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Abstract 
Information feedback in recurrent construction bidding is an important variable in optimal 
procurement design. Contractors tend to optimize their bids in recurrent bidding with positive 
reviews of historic bids. Our experiment examines the effects of no and partial information 
feedback on the bidding trends of (inexperienced) student bidders’, and the extent to which 
their bidding tends to agree with the behavioural patterns proposed by learning theory. The 
results show that the variations in bids over time for both information feedback levels are 
statistically significant. Although the bidders with partial bidding feedback are more likely to 
vary their bids as indicated by learning theory, their bids are less competitive than those with 
no bidding feedback information. Construction clients would need to consider the information 
feedback in their procurement of construction services to achieve efficiency in construction 
bidding. 
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Introduction 
Generally, construction procurement practices are a matter of choice for both public and 
private sector clients. One particular procurement policy that may affect competition in 
descending first-price sealed-bid construction bidding (i.e. lowest bidder wins at the lowest 
price) is the availability of information about bids submitted in preceding bidding competitions. 
Although the level of feedback information on historic bids varies across clients, in many 
cases, clients do not provide feedback information or provide insufficient feedback to 
contractors (Drew and Fellows 1996). Ockenfels and Selten (2005) claim that information 
feedback in repeated auctions is an important design variable in optimal procurement design, 
since it can substantially affect outcomes, even when the feedback has no strategic 
information value. At worst, irrelevant bidding feedback information can be ignored by the 
bidders. It follows that information never has a negative value to the decision-maker 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). 
 
There is a large number of studies in the conventional economics literature that have used 
experiments to explore the effects of information feedback in sealed-bid auctions. They 
provide a substantial amount of evidence that varying information feedback affect bidders’ 
competitiveness to different degrees in sealed-bid auctions, thereby affecting the revenues 
of those accepting bids to buy or sell (e.g. Issac and Walker 1985; Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
2002; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2008). In the context of construction auctions, only 
recently Soo and Oo (2010) examined the effects of two information feedback conditions (full 
and partial) on student (inexperienced) bidders’ bidding behaviour in an experiment. Over 
the eight bidding rounds in their experiment, they found that the variations in bids over time 
for full information feedback are statistically significant, but not for bids from bidders with 
partial bidding feedback. Also, bidders with full bidding feedback are more competitive than 
those with partial bidding feedback. If such evidence is found to be robust, it has important 
policy implications for construction clients’ procurement practices. However, the state of 
knowledge in this area remains woefully inadequate, and more research is needed. 
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In this paper, we investigate the effects of no and partial information feedback on 
construction bidding. Our study overlaps with Soo and Oo (2010) on the partial information 
treatment, and the results should be viewed as complementary. The experiment of the 
present paper is analogous to that of Soo and Oo, with the following differences. First, the 
reported experiment was extended to ten rounds rather than eight and therefore provides 
additional insight into learning in recurrent bidding. Second, there were only four rather than 
five bidders. In addition, the investigation of learning effects in the paper proceeds along a 
different dimension. To theoretically explain the observations, it examines the extent to 
which the subjects’ bidding trends agree with the behavioural patterns proposed by learning 
direction theory in Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Selten and Buchta (1999). 
 
Information Feedback Conditions 
The information feedback adopted by construction clients in sealed bid auctions can be 
broadly classified into full, limited and no information. In the full information feedback 
condition, bidders were informed at the end of each auction about all bids and the identity of 
the bidder making each bid. In the partial information feedback condition, bidders were 
provided only with the winning bid and the identity of the winning bidder at the end of each 
auction. These two information feedback conditions are more common among public sector 
clients that must maintain public accountability. For example, while the Government in 
Singapore adopts full information feedback in their public procurement (see 
www.gebiz.gov.sg), many government agencies opt for partial information feedback only (e.g. 
public agencies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Australia). No information feedback, on the 
other hand, is prevalent in private sector procurement of construction services. The high 
degree of post-bid negotiation in private sector procurement may explain the clients’ 
unwillingness to provide feedback information to bidders. Nonetheless, Drew and Fellows 
(1996) detected that contractors in their survey obtained historic bidding data from a variety 
of sources, including: competitors, subcontractors, friendly acquaintances, suppliers and 
newspaper. 
 
Although the above information feedback conditions have been found to elicit behavioural 
effects among bidders, the experimental findings in the economics literature seem to be 
mixed. It is also noted that the experiments on sealed bid auctions were designed in different 
settings, namely predominantly ascending first-price sealed-bid auction (i.e. highest bidder 
wins at the highest price) as compared to this experiment with  descending first-price sealed-
bid auction (i.e. lowest bidder wins at the lowest price). For example, the classic paper by 
Isaac and Walker (1985) found that the bid prices in partial feedback condition are higher 
than those generated in full feedback condition in ascending sealed bid auctions with four 
bidders, thereby raising the revenues for those agents accepting bids or accepting offers. 
More recently, Neugebauer and Perote (2008) examine the order effect of feedback 
information in bidding behaviour. They ran the experiment in both orders: no-to-partial 
information order and the reverse, partial-to-no information order. Their findings suggest 
significant order effect and the feedback information on winning bids triggers an immediate 
response in bidding behaviour, leading to higher overall bid prices. Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2002), in a descending sealed-bid auction, compare three levels of information feedback 
and conclude that full information feedback leads to higher bid prices compared to partial 
and no information feedback. Other studies that provide overviews of experimental studies 
on the effects of feedback information include Ockenfels and Selten (2005), and 
Neugebauer and Selten (2006). 
   
Learning in Construction Bidding 
According to Drew and Fellows (1996), contractors use feedback on historic bids for four 
different purposes: (i) for deciding on whether or not to bid for future projects, (ii) for 
determining mark-up for future projects, (iii) for analysing their bidding performance; and (iv) 
for analysing bidding performance of their competitors. In competitor analysis, information on 
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historic bids could be used to estimate the probable range of competitors’ bids, and to 
differentiate the less serious competitors from the more serious, thus allowing a contractor 
concerned with bidding strategies to target key competitors (Oo et al. 2010). Fu et al. (2002) 
suggest that bidders tend to optimize their bids in recurrent construction bidding process with 
positive reviews of previous bidding results, suggesting feedback plays a key role within the 
experiential learning process in bidding (i.e. learning from experience, see Kolb (1984)). 
They found that experienced contractors who bid more frequently submitted more 
competitive bids than contractors who bid only occasionally. A conceptual framework of 
learning in recurrent construction bidding was proposed in Fu et al. (2004) in which a 
contracting firm is seen as an interpretation system. The learning process activates the 
interpretation process that transforms a flow of data (i.e. previous bidding results and data 
derived from completed and ongoing projects) into information, and that interpreted 
information is incorporated into next bidding decision to enhance competitiveness. In their 
examination of a bidding dataset covering six years, there is evidence of behavioural 
regularity among experienced contractors when an optimal bidding strategy has been 
reached in what they refer to as steady-state learning phase in recurrent construction 
bidding. However, their analysis only partially supports the existence of rapid learning during 
the start-up phase among inexperienced contractors.  
    
In an attempt to link observed sensitivity of bids to information feedback, a learning direction 
theory in repeated first-price sealed-bid auction has been proposed by Selten and Stoecker 
(1986) and Selten and Buchta (1999). Learning direction theory is a qualitative behavioural 
theory about learning in repetitive decision tasks. As an illustration of the theory, Selten and 
Buchta (1999) used an example of a marksman who tries to hit a trunk. If the arrow misses 
the trunk to one side the marksman shifts the bow in the direction of the other side when he 
gives it another try. The behaviour of the marksman in the example is based on a qualitative 
causal relationship: if he misses to the right, for instance, then he tends to aim more to the 
left. This line of reasoning links to ex-post rationality, one looks at what could have been 
better last time and makes qualitative adjustment (i.e. the direction of the change rather than 
its size) in this direction, in which the right kind of feedback plays a key role therein. This 
theory has been supported by the data of diverse experiments (for a review, see Selten 
2004). In Neugebauer and Selten’s (2006) experiment, for example, 92% of their experiment 
subjects conformed to the behavioural patterns proposed by learning direction theory. It is 
noted that a possible quantification of learning direction theory using impulse balance theory 
to account for different information feedback conditions has also been proposed in Selten et 
al. (2005) and Neugebauer and Selten (2006). In principle, the impulse balance theory 
weighs the foregone payoff upon losing against the foregone payoff upon winning, in which 
the impulse balance point is the bid where the probability of weighted foregone payoffs from 
losing and winning are equal. However, only the idea of learning direction theory is 
applicable to the experiment of the present paper. We examine the extent to which the 
subjects’ bidding trends agree with the behavioural patterns proposed by the theory in the 
experiment. 
 
Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the University Sains Malaysia between August and 
November 2010. The design used between-subjects variation and involved information 
feedback as the treatment variable. In total, all eighteen final year students in the Quantity 
Surveying degree participated in the experiment. The use of student subjects is appropriate 
in an experiment for which the level of experience is not a moderator variable (i.e. the level 
of experience is controlled - inexperienced bidders). The student subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of two treatments with ten bidding rounds (one round per week) per 
treatment. Each of the two primary groups were further split into four subgroups (two to three 
students in each subgroup) to emulate a bidding competition of four competing bidders. In 
treatment P (partial information feedback), subjects were provided the winning bid and the 
identity of the winning bidder in the preceding round at the beginning of each bidding round. 
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In treatment N (no information feedback), subjects received no information about previous 
bids (i.e. winning and losing bids). 
 
In weekly meetings (between 30 – 60 minutes), the groups were given a list of six 
hypothetical projects and the subjects were required to decide which project to bid for, and 
the bid price if deciding to bid. The general instruction to the subjects was that their ultimate 
aim was to survive and prosper in a competition where the lowest bidder wins the job, but 
how this can be achieved was left to them. This reflects the strategic nature of the 
construction pricing problem. The sixty hypothetical projects were conventional buildings, 
such as schools and institutional buildings that involve conventional designs, and do not 
require any unusual construction technologies. This was done to control the effect of project 
type on bidders’ bidding decisions. Apart from the project information (location, duration, 
client and contract type), the subjects were also given an unbiased cost estimate for each 
hypothetical project, which is the net project construction cost that includes site overheads 
and project preliminaries (i.e., total of direct cost estimate + site overheads). Here, identical 
hypothetical projects were given to both treatment P and N groups to enable direct 
comparisons. 
 
In an attempt to make the experiment more realistic and to maintain the subjects’ interests 
over ten rounds, it was conducted in an environment in which experiences (learning) could 
be gained and bankruptcy could occur. Each subject was given a start-up capital of RM 
400,000 1  to sustain the operating expenses (capital charges, general overheads, etc.) 
estimated at RM 40,000 per bidding round, and profit/loss was generated for each 
hypothetical project they won in the experiment. The profit/loss was determined by deducting 
a randomly assigned final cost (ranging from 90% to 110% of unbiased cost estimate) from 
the winning bid. In this way, subject whose losses exhausted their start-up capital and profit 
gained from projects would be declared bankrupt and no longer allowed to bid. Similarly, 
failure to win job to pay for operating expenses (fixed costs such as capital charges, general 
overheads, etc.) would eventually force the group out of the ‘market’- a reality in the ‘real’ 
construction industry. Also, the subjects have limited working capacity and would have 
incurred a cost penalty (for the added costs of securing additional resources) if they had to 
operate beyond their optimal capacity (maximum five projects on hand at a time). After each 
round, subjects in both treatments were informed privately of their capacity utilization and the 
profit/loss generated from the projects they won in previous rounds. The subject that 
generated the biggest profit in the respective treatment at the end of the experiment was 
declared the winner and received a mystery prize (i.e., a prescribed textbook for their 
course). 
 
Although the practicality of an experimental approach in construction bidding research has 
been demonstrated in previous studies (e.g. Dyer et al. 1989; Drew and Skitmore 2006, Oo 
et al. 2007, 2008), the quality of experimental data is obviously related to subjects’ 
seriousness when bidding in the experiment. Therefore, for every project for which the 
subjects decided to bid, they were asked to indicate the estimated chance of winning with 
their bid. This provided a means for gauging their seriousness using a correlation test. In 
addition, after each round, the subjects were asked to indicate how they used the feedback 
in formulating their bidding strategies. At the end of the experiment, the following questions 
were also asked: 
 
 How did you learn and improve your bidding performance? 
 How long did it take to learn about the bidding trends of your competitors? 
 
 
                                                          
1
 MYR 1 = AUD 0.355  or EUR 0.248 at the time of the experiment. MYR 400 000 is approximately AUD 140 000 
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Experimental Results 
The unbiased cost estimate provides a common baseline from which to measure the 
subjects’ competitiveness and for comparing bids between two treatment groups. 
Correspondingly, the two measures of competitiveness between bids adopted in the analysis 
are given below: 
 
BCP = 100 (xi – x)/ x       (Eq. 1) 
 
where BCP is the bid competitiveness percentage, xi is the i
th subject’s bid and x is the value 
of lowest (winning) bid entered for a project. Lower BCP indicates greater competitiveness 
and vice versa, with minimum and maximum competitiveness being constrained between 
infinity and zero, respectively. 
 
MUCR = xi / x        (Eq. 2) 
 
where MUCR is the mark-up competitiveness ratio, xi is the i
th subject’s bid and x is the 
unbiased cost estimate for a project. A MUCR of 1 indicates that a bid is at the unbiased 
cost estimate (i.e., zero mark-up), and below 1 indicates a bidder has submitted a bid lower 
than the unbiased cost estimate that leads to a lower bid. Lower MUCR values indicate 
greater competitiveness since the lowest bidder wins at the lowest bid price. Consistency in 
bidding can be gauged from the resultant standard deviation. 
 
Subject 
ID 
No. of 
bidding 
attempts 
No. of 
winning 
bids 
Average 
mark-
up % 
Average  
BCP 
S.D. 
of 
BCP 
Bidding 
success 
rate (%) 
Market 
share 
(%) 
Profit/loss ($) 
Partial information feedback group (treatment P)     
A1 60 28 7.29 3.33 5.96 46.67 43.73 2,647,900.99  
A2 58 3 11.34 7.69 7.28 5.17 5.53      1,592,900.00  
A3 47 13 7.51 4.40 3.58 27.66 22.57        
3,299,650.00  
A4 46 16 4.49 1.84 2.47 34.78 28.18        
3,425,394.00  
No information feedback group (treatment N)     
B1 38 22 4.22 1.36 2.97 57.89 40.45 2,739,350.00  
B2 36 21 4.68 1.83 3.30 58.33 33.40        
2,790,550.00  
B3 49 6 5.72 2.52 1.81 12.24 8.83        808,450.00  
B4 60 11 4.93 1.71 1.38 18.33 17.32   2,066,700.00  
Table 1 The breakdown of bid data according to experimental treatment 
 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the bidding data from both treatment groups. A total of 211 
and 183 bids were obtained from treatments P (Subjects A1 to A4) and N (Subjects B1 to 
B4), respectively. The range of average mark-up % applied to the unbiased cost estimate 
varied between 4.49 and 11.34 for treatment P, while a lower range between 4.22 and 5.72 
was recorded in treatment N. A further examination of the dataset revealed the presence of 
three outliers (i.e. bids that are 25% above the winning bid) in treatment P, which may 
explain its variations in average mark-up %. These outliers were removed in subsequent 
statistical tests. The bidding performance of individual subjects is further examined in terms 
of number of winning bids, average mark-up %, average BCP, bidding success rate, market 
share and profit/loss. It is interesting to note that the winners (i.e. Subjects A4 and B2) 
recorded the lowest number of bidding attempts in their respective treatment group, 
suggesting they were selective in their bid/no-bid decision. Also, they are very close to each 
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other in terms of their average mark-up% (4.49% and 4.68%) and average BCP (1.84% and 
1.83%), even with different treatments. 
 
Seriousness of Bidding 
We begin the statistical analysis of the bidding dataset with a test on the subjects’ 
seriousness of bidding. Notwithstanding the experimental treatment, if a subject has 
submitted a serious bid (i.e. with low mark-up %), it follows that the corresponding estimated 
chance of winning should be high and vice versa. The Pearson Correlation coefficient 
between the subjects’ mark-up % and their estimated chances of winning has the expected 
negative sign,  r = - 0.072, significant at p < 0.10 level. This would indicate that the subjects 
had bid seriously in the experiment. However, the correlation is rather weak. A further 
examination on the dataset shows that the corresponding correlations are -0.164 (p < 0.05) 
and 0.032 (p > 0.05) for the bids from Round 1 to 5 and 6 to 10. Although the latter is not 
statistically significant, the presence of high bids which were associated with high estimate 
for chances of winning at the later stage of the experiment could possibly due to the fact that, 
as the experiment proceeded, the relatively experienced  subjects were more confident in 
their ability to win bids.  
 
First Bids 
It is especially interesting to examine the subjects’ first bids because they were submitted 
before the subjects were exposed to different experimental treatments. In addition, no 
experience could be gained at this first bidding round. Using the 36 bids obtained in first 
bidding round, a Mann-Whitney U test was performed to test the difference in bidding 
competitiveness in terms of MUCR between the two treatment groups. The results show that 
the first bids from the two treatment groups do not differ significantly (U = 137.5; Z = -0.775; 
p > 0.05). This means that, in round 1, different experimental treatments in different groups 
do not influence the subjects’ bidding behaviour. 
 
Between Treatments Comparison 
When comparing the development of the subjects’ bids in later periods, the means of MUCR 
for the P and N treatment groups are 1.0732 and 1.0495, respectively. A Mann-Whitney U 
test shows that the difference is statistically significant (U = 13142.00; Z = -5.282; p < 0.01). 
This suggests that the bids from partial information feedback group are less competitive on 
average with a higher mean MUCR compared to those in the no feedback group. In addition, 
the standard deviation for the partial information feedback group is higher (i.e. 0.0494 as 
compared to 0.0321 in treatment N), indicating a lower degree of consistency in their bidding 
attempts. The higher average bids with lower consistency in the partial information feedback 
group is consistent with the subjects using the winning bid as a bench mark in their decision 
making as if it was the market price, in their attempts to maximize their profits. 
 
To examine the bidding trends in P and N treatments, Figures 1(a) and 1 (b) plot the 
corresponding MUCR over the rounds of the experiment. LOWESS curves were fitted to the 
scatter plots to allow for bidding trends to be observed from the dataset. It can be seen that 
the mark-up for treatment P is continually decreasing over the ten bidding rounds, while it is 
rather flat from round 3 onwards in treatment N. These decreasing trends in MUCR provide 
a strong indication of continuous learning leading to more competitive bids generally over 
time. For treatment P, however, the mark-up decreases steadily moving from round 1 to 
round 8, in which the MUCR decreases from 1.12 in round 1 to 1.05 in round 8. Apparently, 
information about the winning bids is of great importance for subjects in treatment P. As 
revealed in the questionnaire, they were able to assess their bids relative to winning bids, 
and to review their performance and adjust their bidding strategies accordingly. 
 
In treatment N, with no information about previous bids, the relatively flat bidding trend from 
round 3 onwards suggests a high consistency in bidding among the four subjects. However, 
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it appears that the subjects had experienced a short adjustment phase from Round 1 to 2 as 
demonstrated by the steeply decreasing trend, before they were provided with feedback on 
profit or loss of the jobs they won in preceding rounds. The profit and loss statements 
provided to the subjects were not available until the end of Round 2 since the hypothetical 
projects have minimum project duration of two rounds. Indeed, the release of profit and loss 
statements did trigger an immediate response in the subjects’ bidding trend, given the slight 
increase observed between Round 3 and 4. Further evidence of the upward adjustment can 
be found by considering the mean ranks of MUCR in the subsequent subseries analysis on 
changes in bidding (Table 2).  
 
    
(a) Partial information feedback group              (b) No information feedback group      
(treatment P)                              (treatment N) 
 
 
Figure 1 MUCR scatter plots for partial and no information feedback groups 
 
Round Subseries Mean Rank N Chi-Square df p 
Partial information feedback group (treatment P)    
1 - 3 3.44 26 26.24 3 0.000 
4 - 5 2.63     
6 - 7 2.27     
8 - 10 1.65     
No information feedback group (treatment N)   
1 - 2 2.13 23 9.63 3 0.022 
3 - 4 3.17     
5 - 6 2.52     
7 - 10 2.17     
Table 2 Friedman test results for partial and no information feedback groups   
 
From the LOWESS curves in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), it can be seen that there are 
disjointedness in bidding trends over the ten rounds of experiment. The disjointed trends in 
the respective LOWESS curve form subseries of bids for checking statistically differences in 
A1 A2 A3 A4 LOWESS Curve B2 B3 B4 B1 
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bidding using a Friedman test. As shown in Table 2, there are four subseries of bids in 
treatments P and N, respectively. The mean ranks were calculated for all subseries (i.e. a 
higher mean rank indicates a higher MUCR overall) and the results show that there is a 
significant overall difference among the four mean ranks in both treatments P (χ2 (3) = 26.24, 
p < 0.01) and N (χ2 (3) = 9.63, p < 0.05). This suggests that the variations in bids over the 
bidding rounds in response to the experimental treatments are statistically significant. The 
subjects do apply different bidding strategies (mark-ups) based on the given set of feedback 
information, although the subjects in treatment N were only informed privately about their 
capacity utilization and the profit or loss generated from the projects they won in preceding 
rounds. In this, the mean rank of MUCR for Rounds 3 to 4 subseries is higher than the 
subsequent two subseries, suggesting they had adjusted their bids (i.e., with high mark-ups 
to maximize profit) in response to the information received at the end of Round 2.   
 
Confirmation of Learning Direction Theory 
In both treatment groups, it appears that learning does occur at different rates, with 
statistically significant variations in bids over the rounds of the experiment. The 
questionnaire survey reveals that the majority of the subjects learnt about the bidding trend 
by experimenting with their bids for improving their bidding performance. They were 
particularly concerned with the cost penalty for operating beyond the optimal capacity in their 
bidding decisions. The quoted period for learning about their competitors’ bidding trends 
ranges from two to ten rounds of the experiment.  
 
Consider now the application of learning direction theory to this experiment. As the subjects’ 
ultimate aim is to win and make a profit, conditional on the allowable capacity utilization 
(maximum five projects on hand at any particular bidding round),  it  follows that the subjects 
would be in one of the following two conditions at the end of the preceding round: 
 
High level of capacity utilization: number of projects on hand ≥ 3 
Low level of capacity utilization: number of projects on hand < 3 
where three projects on hand (the mid-point of five) were used as the cut-off point in 
determining the level of capacity utilization. A high level of capacity utilization means that a 
subject won a number of projects in the preceding round. This doesn’t necessarily mean a 
high profit. He might have received a greater payoff by submitting higher bids and winning 
fewer contracts. Similarly, with a low level of capacity utilization the subject could have won 
more projects by submitting lower bids and winning more projects in the preceding round. 
Therefore, the learning direction theory implies that after experiencing a high level of 
capacity utilization a subject tends to increase his bids, while after experiencing a low level 
of capacity utilization the subject tends to decrease his bids. 
  
Table 3 shows the number of bid changes in terms of mean MUCR, i.e., increases or 
decreases of the bids from one round to the next. Changes are listed separately according to 
the experimental treatment and the subjects’ condition of high or low level of capacity 
utilization in the preceding round. A first observation reveals that in 100% of the observations 
there was an increase or decrease from one bidding round to the following, suggesting the 
subjects had in general adjusted their mark-ups. In treatment P, the bid changes that go in 
the predicted directions after experiencing high and low levels of capacity utilization are 
about 60% and 80%, respectively. However, the corresponding percentages in treatment N 
are only about 40% and 65%. This suggests that bid changes in the predicted direction 
occurred less often in treatment N. A Chi-Square test of independence was performed to 
examine the relationship between bid change and experience condition in the respective 
treatment. The results show that the relationship is significant in treatment P (χ2 (1) = 5.386, 
p < 0.05), but not in treatment N (χ2 (1) = 0.125, p > 0.05). The test statistic provides further 
evidence that the subjects in treatment N were less likely to vary their bids as indicated by 
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learning direction theory than were those in treatment P. In both experience conditions, a 
subject in treatment N had limited information whether he could have performed better than 
preceding round by increasing or decreasing his bids; in hindsight, the subject did not 
receive information on historic bids.  
 
Treatment Experience condition Mean MUCR 
increase (%) 
Mean MUCR 
decrease (%) 
Row total (%) 
P ≥ 3 jobs on hand 10 (59) 7 (41) 17 (47) 
 < 3 jobs on hand 4 (21) 15 (79) 19 (53) 
N ≥ 3 jobs on hand 7 (41) 10 (59) 17 (50) 
 < 3 jobs on hand 6 (35) 11 (65) 17 (50) 
Column total (%)  27 (39) 43 (61) 70 (100) 
Table 3 Frequencies of bid changes in rounds 2-10 
 
Discussion 
The insignificant difference in first bids between the two treatment groups provides evidence 
that the student subjects’ level of experience is not a moderator variable in the experiment. 
That is, the level of experience is controlled – they were all inexperienced bidders before the 
experiment. In addition, the quality of the experimental data has been demonstrated as the 
test results show the seriousness of the subjects’ bidding, which justifies the use of student 
subjects in this kind of experiment. It should be noted that the use of student subjects is very 
common in experimental auctions and business decision making studies (e.g. Remus 1986, 
Depositario et. al 2009). 
  
In contrast to Soo and Oo’s (2010) experiment on full and partial information feedback that 
suggests the more limited the feedback the higher the bid prices, our results show that bids 
from the partial feedback group are higher on average than those in the no feedback group. 
This would be in line with another notion in which the more limited the feedback the lower 
the bid prices (Isaac and Walker 1985). These contrasting findings warrant further 
experimental studies in this area.  
 
In examining the subjects’ learning in the experiment it is apparent from the variations in the 
bids - the observed learning in treatment P - supports the conclusion that the release of the 
winning bids trigger an immediate response in bidding behaviour, similar to that found by 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002). Indeed, the observed learning in both treatments P and N 
are in line with Neugebauer and Perote’s (2008) findings that subjects learn to bid on the 
basis of winning bids when provided with this information, and reflect on their bids when 
information on winning bid is unavailable. In treatment N, it seems that the subjects learn to 
bid on the basis of repeated reflection on their bids, where fewer bids go in the direction 
predicted by learning direction theory. Despite this finding, it is clear that the learning 
direction theory has the potential to provide qualitative predictions about bidding trends, 
without a fully-fledged behavioural model. The basic principle of ex-post rationality in 
learning direction theory is also in line with the logic behind McCaffer and Pettitt’s (1976) 
cusum curve that predicted changes in contractors’ bids in response to need of work. 
 
Conclusion 
Information feedback is an important design variable in optimal construction procurement 
designs. Feedback plays a key role in contractors’ learning process in recurrent construction 
bidding. Our experiment examined the effects of no and partial information feedback on 
construction bidding, and the extent to which inexperienced bidders’ bidding trends agree 
with the behavioural patterns proposed by learning direction theory. The results show that 
the variations in bids over time for both levels of feedback are statistically significant. The 
bidders with partial bidding feedback are more likely to vary their bids as indicated by 
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learning direction theory, but their bids are less competitive than those with no bidding 
feedback. The fact that different information feedback does elicit a statistically significant 
behavioural effect among bidders has implications for construction clients. They would need 
to consider the feedback in their procurement practices.  
 
However, in order to determine the point at which feedback can be regarded as ‘sufficient’ to 
generate efficiency in construction bidding, exploration of pricing practice in response to 
different feedback conditions is required along three dimensions: empirical work on 
contractors’ pricing regarding the three possible levels of feedback, empirical work on 
contractors’ learning  in decision making on pricing; and empirical work on order effects of 
feedback on contractors’ bidding behaviour - moving from no-to-full information feedback 
condition and the reverse. The latter is of special importance for construction clients to 
examine the impacts of changes in policy on information feedback in their procurement 
practices.  
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